This page is linked to a discussion about the implications of uncertainty in science and mathematics. The writer was a contributor to that dialogue, but the context of that discussion may have distorted his position. Essentially, his view is that certainty is a subjective desideratum and the failure to achieve it does not vitiate the canons of science or elevate art to a superior position.
The substantive difficulty I have has to do with context changing meaning. Rightly or wrongly, I have a sense that my words in the context of the dialogue do not have the same meaning as in the context in which they were written for the Science-Structure group. For example, in the course of these postings to the I have tried to make the following points:
1. Our minds are "meat" computers that operate by some (not clearly understood) elaboration of the conditioned-reflex box (as described by W. Grey Walter in The Living Brain).
2. The data on which the mind operates are both externally-originated and internally (self- referentially) generated.
3. It is in the nature of what the mind does that metaphor is the metaphor for the thinking process. Or, we cannot express our understanding of our (external and internal) perceptions except through metaphor.
4. There is an external reality, of which we (collectively) are (again self-referentially) a part, which has a precedence over the internally-constructed metaphors which we (perforce) use to process and describe our perceptions. In the beginning was "the World", not "the Word."
5. Science (in this context) is our metaphor for the internalization (understanding) of the external reality. Mathematics is a rigorous language (of metaphors) which helps us achieve consistency in our understanding. Art is the process by which we deal with matters that are undecidable by science or mathematics. Subjectively, we are motivated to do art to achieve a sense of closure. The drive for closure makes us seek certainty but it is in the nature of the world and of mathematics that we cannot achieve ultimate certainty (although practical, useful certainty is obtainable in many things).
6. Art is a principal motivator for doing science, but it is also a motivator for many other internally-conducted activities (including "anti-science").
7. Using the language of mathematics, Gödel has shown (self-referentially) that we cannot obtain closure in mathematics in the sense of a set of rules that is both consistent and complete. That is to say, there are true propositions that cannot be proven mathematically to be true (and false that cannot be proven false).
8. In science, with respect to external reality, there is a cognate unavailability of certainty revealed in quantum mechanics and non-linear processes for which we use the metaphor chaotic.
9. These characteristics of mathematics and science -- no matter how subjectively disturbing they may be to some -- may be viewed optimistically as assuring us that there will never be an end to interesting questions to explore. Be that as it may, these characteristics do not establish that art (or poetry) is superior to science or that one need not be rigorous in the application of experiment, observation, analysis, or logic to any effort at achieving understanding. And if certainty may not be attained, understanding may. Contrary to Keats, while "truth" may be beautiful, "beauty" is not truth.
All these propositions, together, provide a context for any particular contribution I have made to our discussion. Taken out of this context, my statement about the continuing value of science appears weak, conceding points that I would still maintain. It is, of course, anyone's right to take exception to anything I have stated, but fairness requires some explicit declaration of the exception and care not to quote the contribution in a context that implies a conclusion that does not comport with my own views. What I have to make clear here is that any implication that uncertainty diminishes the importance of science as a method of acquiring understanding or promotes art as a better criterion for accepting a proposition than survival of tests of falsifiability is contrary to my thinking about such matters.
Sander Rubin
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Created: 9 December 1995
Revised: 12 January 1996